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Earl Pollock
Judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the last three
decades has sharply expanded the requirements of due process in state criminal
litigation.' In our dual system of government, a convicted state prisoner
whose trial failed to meet those requirements may theoretically obtain
redress in either state or federal courts.2 On the principle of comity,3 how-
ever, the state courts are given the first opportunity to adjudicate the
prisoner's constitutional claim. Thus eligibility for direct review of the con-
viction by the United States Supreme Court requires that the prisoner take
an appeal to the highest state court in which a decision could be had ;4 and
eligibility for collateral review of the conviction in the lower federal courts
on writ of habeas corpus requires that the prisoner first exhaust all avail-
able state remedies, 5 and then elicit a denial of certiorari from the United
States Supreme Court.
6
But this requirement that federal courts stay their hand until the state
courts have disposed of the case presupposes that state post-trial proced-
ures are adequate to vindicate the federal right asserted-either by appeal or
collateral attack.7 This presupposition has not always been borne out in
practice.
1. The movement was initiated by Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob-domi-
nated trial), but received its chief impetus from the celebrated Scottsboro Cases. See
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (denial of effective assistance of counsel in a
capital case) ; Norris v. Alabama, 294- U.S. 587 (1935) (systematic exclusion of Negroes from
grand and petit juries). Other leading cases include Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936) (use of coerced confessions), and Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (know-
ing use by prosecution of perjured testimony). For subsequent refinements of these basic
prohibitions, see Boskey and Pickering, Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure,
13 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 266 (1946) ; cf. Holtzoff, Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal
Courts, 25 B.U.L. REv. 26 (1945).
2. U.S. CoNsT. ART. VI (Supremacy Clause); See Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637
(1884).
3. See Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 291 (1898) ; Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 182
(1884). Cf. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204-08 (1950) ; Note, Certiorari and Habeas
Corpius: The Comity Comedy, 46 ILL. L. REv. 478 (1951).
4. 28 U.S.C. §1257 (Supp. III 1950).
5. 28 U.S.C. §2254 (Supp. III 1950): "An applicant shall not be deemed to have ex-
hausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this
section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure,
the question presented." The statute was intended to codify Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114
(1944). See Note, 61 HARv. L. REV. 657, 664-667 (1948).
6. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950). See Note, Certiorari and Habeas Corpus:
The Comity Comedy, 46 ILL. L. REv. 478 (1951).
7. See Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238 (1949); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 564
(1947) (concurring opinion). If the state provides no remedy, or the remedy which it
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A particularly flagrant example has been, Illinois.8 In a series of opinions
beginning with White v. Ragei,9 the United States Supreme Court has shown
marked impatience with "the Illinois merry-go-round of habeas corpus,
coram nobis, and writ of error." 10  Finally, in Young v. Ragen," the Court
indicated that unless Illinois took steps to provide an adequate procedure,
the way would be open for Illinois prisoners to obtain habeas corpus relief
in the federal courts without first exhausting their state remedies. In re-
sponse to that opinion, and after considerable prodding by the local bar,'
2
the Illinois legislature in 1949 enacted the Post Conviction Hearing Act.' 3
The Act "provides for a new proceeding to afford an inquiry into the
constitutional integrity of the proceedings in which the judgment was
entered.''14 The new procedure has been found consistent with the Illinois
constitution,15 has received wide acclaim, 16 and has been tentatively accepted
by the federal courts as an adequate state remedy which Illinois prisoners
must exhaust before recourse to federal habeas corpus may be had.' 7 Its acid
test, however, will come with the Illinois Supreme Court's ultimate disposi-
tion of three cases remanded from the United States Supreme Court: Jennings
v. Illinois, Lalran v. Illinois, and Sherman v. Illinois.'8
The Pacts
The facts of the three cases are substantially identical. Each of the
provides is inadequate in practice, the prisoner is excused from the exhaustion require-
ment. 28 U.S.C. §2254 (Supp. III 1950). See Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944).
8. For a critique of the hopelessly inadequate post-trial remedies in Illinois prior to the
Post Conviction Act, see Comment, Collateral Relief from Conzdctions in Violation of Due
Process in Illinois, 42 ILL. L. REV. 329 (1947) ; Comment, 4 Study of the Illinois Supreme
Court, 15 U. OF Cui. L. REV. 107, 118-131 (1947). During the three years preceding the
1949 October Term, 49% of all in forma pauperis petitions for certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court came from Illinois prisoners. Chief Justice Vinson, Work of the
Federal Courts, an address before the American Bar Association, September 7, 1949,
printed in 69 Sup. Ct. V, VIII (1949).
9. 324 U.S. 760 (1945). See also Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211 (1946) ; Carter
v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946) ; Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947) ; Marino v. Ragen,
332 U.S. 561 (1947); Loftus v. Illinois, 334 U.S. 804 (1948); Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S.
235 (1949).
10. Mr. Justice Rutledge in Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 570 (1947) (concurring
opinion). Joined by justices Douglas and Murphy, Mr. Justice Rutledge urged that federal
courts in Illinois make federal habeas corpus available to Illinois prisoners without waiting
any longer for the establishment of an adequate remedy.
11. 337 U.S. 235, 238-9(1949).
12. The Act was prepared and sponsored by a joint committee of the Illinois-State and
Chicago Bar Associations. See Jenner, The Illinois Post Conviction Hearing 4ct, 9 F.R.D.
347, 357 (1950). Mr. Jenner was chairman of this committee. His article apparently
constitutes the "legislative history" of the Act.
13. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, §§826-832 (1951). See Note, Post Convziction Remedies in
Illinois, 40 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 606 (1950).
14. People v. Dale, 406 Ill. 238, 245, 92 N.E.2d 761 (1950), holding the Act constitu-
tional. See Jenner, supra note 12, at 357.
15. People v. Dale, supra note 14, 41 J. CRIM. L. & CRINOLOGY 335 (1950). On
remand of the case, Dale obtained his release. See note 24 infra. Other Illinois Supreme
Court opinions dealing with the Post Conviction Act are People v. Hartman, 408 I1. 133,
96 N.E.2d 449 (1951), and People v. Farley, 408 I1. 288, 96 N.E.2d 453 (1951).
16. See, e.g., Chief Justice Vinson, supra note S.
17. Ferguson v. Ragen, 338 U.S. 833 (1949); United States ex rel. Defrates v. Ragen,
181 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1950) ; United States ex rel. Hamby v. Ragen, 178 F.2d 379 (7th
Cir. 1949); United States ex rel. Peters v. Ragen, 178 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1949).
18. 72 S.Ct 123 (1951). The cases were argued on November 6, 1951; the opinion
was handed down on December 3, 1951.
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petitioners was tried on a felony charge in the Cook County Criminal
Court. 19 The prosecution offered in evidence statements signed by the
defendant in which he purportedly confessed his guilt. Defense counsel
moved to suppress the statements on the ground that they had been
obtained by third degree methods. After a full hearing, the presiding
judge denied the motion and admitted the statements in evidence. A con-
viction followed. No appeal was taken, apparently because of financial
inability to procure a transcript of the trial proceedings.
After the passage. of the Post Conviction Act, each of the petitioners
applied to the trial court for a hearing.2 0 Among other allegations of
denial of due process,2 ' each petitioner again charged that the confession
admitted in evidence at his trial had been obtained by coercion.2 2 In re-
sponse to each petition, the State's Attorney moved to dismiss the pro-
ceeding on the ground, among others, that the claims had been conclusively
adjudicated at the trial and were therefore res judicata.28 The court, with-
out specifying its grounds of decision, granted the motion and dismissed the
petition without a hearing on the truth of the petitioner's allegations.24
19. LaFrana and Sherman were both charged with murder; Jennings, with armed
robbery.
20. The venue of the proceedings is fixed at the court where the conviction took place.
ILL. REv. STAT. C. 38, §826 (1951).
21. Jennings and Sherman also alleged that the prosecution had knowingly used
perjured testimony.
22. It should be noted that the petitioners do not dispute the fairness of the confession
hearings at their trials. They contend rather that the trial court erred in admitting
the confessions.
23. Two other grounds were also given in support of the motion to dismiss: (1) that
the petitioner's allegations are mere conclusions, unaccompanied by affidavits having
sufficient probative force to require an answer; (2) that the facts alleged by petitioner,
if true, would not constitute a denial of due process. The identical motion, in mimeo-
graphed form, is filed by the State's Attorney in each Post Conviction proceeding in the
Cook County Criminal Court, irrespective of the nature of the particular allegations or the
presence of supporting affidavits. Nevertheless, the motion has enjoyed spectacular success.
See note 24 infra.
24. This has been the usual disposition of Post Conviction petitions in the Cook County
Criminal Court. As of November 1, 1951, 197 had been filed. Approximately 50 were
still pending. Of the remainder, only a handful have managed to survive the State's
Attorney's motion to dismiss. Of this number, only three were found to present meri-
torious claims. All three petitioners have been given their release, although not one has
had to undergo a new trial. (1) Curtis Gee (Post Conviction No. 3). This case suggests
that not all judges of the Cook County Criminal Court are applying res judicata to bar
the presentation of coerced confession claims in Post Conviction proceedings. Gee had
been convicted of murder in 1939. In his petition, he alleged that the confession admitted
in evidence at his trial had been extracted from him by physical force. Although this
contention (as in Jennings' case) had been adjudicated adversely to him at the trial
after a full hearing, the State's Attorney's customary motion to dismiss was overruled.
The State's Attorney elected to stand on his motion and a new trial was ordered. The
State's Attorney then applied to the Illinois Supreme Court for a writ of error raising
two questions: whether the State is entitled to appeal a final judgment under the Post
Conviction Act; and whether res judicata barred the relitigation of Gee's confession claim
since it had been determined at the original trial. (Petition for Writ of Error, People v.
Gee, No. 32006, filed April 23, 1951). The Petition for Writ of Error was denied without
opinion. On October 16, 1951, Gee was released from custody on motion of the State's
Attorney.
(2) Frank Dale (Post Conviction No. 4) alleged that he was not permitted counsel
of his own choosing, that a Public Defender was instead foisted upon him. After remand
by the Illinois Supreme Court (see note 15 supra), Dale was given a hearing, and a new
trial was ordered. However, on October 16, 1951, the case was stricken from the call on
motion of the State's Attorney, and Dale was released.
(3) Paul Lopez (Post Conviction No. 65) had been tried on a robbery charge and
[Vol. 42
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The petitioners then applied to the Illinois Supreme Court for writ of
error to review the lower court's action.2 5 Eacli application was dismissed
without argument and without any opinion apart from a cryptic form order2 6
which reads in part: "It is further considered by the Court that after having
examined and reviewed the petition and record in the post conviction hearing
the same is found to disclose no violation or denial of any substantial con-
stitutional rights of the petitioner under the Constitution of the United
States. .. "27 From this judgment, the petitioners successfully applied to
the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari in forma paupersg.
28
The Court, with two Justices dissenting, vacated the judgments below and
remanded the cases to the Illinois Supreme Court "for further proceedings. "29
An analysis of the decision requires a fuller exploration of the issues
before the Court.
The Issues
The petitions present clear and specific allegations in respect to the
extraction and use of coerced confessions to obtain convictions. Taken by
themselves, and if ultimately proven true, these allegations would clearly
entitle petitioners to new trials under the applicable rulings of the United
States Supreme Court.30 And as against the State's Attorney's motion to dis-
miss, these allegations must be taken as true.3 1 It thus seems inconceivable,
despite the language of its judgment order, that the Illinois Supreme Court
based its decision on the ground that these allegations, without more, did
not state a claim on which relief could be granted.
A more reasonable interpretation is that the court meant the petitioners
were not entitled to a hearing in collateral proceedings on constitutional
claims which had been adjudicated at the original trials. This analysis is
consistent with the groundi urged by the State's Attorney in his motion
to dismiss, and with the prior opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court
sustaining the constitutionality of the Post Conviction Act.3
2
sentenced to probation for 2 to 4 years. Two months later, he was charged with having
violated probation, brought before the trial judge, and sentenced to the penitentiary for
3 to 20 years. In his petition, Lopez alleged denial of counsel at the hearing on the pro-
bation violation. Lopez was given a hearing and discharged in December, 1950, after
having served nearly three years of his sentence.
25. As provided under the Post Conviction Act, ILL. Rav. STAT. c. 38, §832 (1951).
26. The identical order has been entered by the Illinois Supreme Court in each of the
twenty-five cases arising under the Post Conviction Act that have reached the United
States Supreme Court on petition for certiorari. See Jennings v. Illinois, 72 S.Ct. 123,
125 (1951).
27. This portion of the unreported judgment orders is set out in the Jennings opinion,
72 S.Ct. at 125.
28. 341 U.S. 947, 342 U.S. 811 (1951).
29. 72 S.Ct. at 127.
30. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940) ; Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940) ; White v. Texas, 309 U.S. 631, 310 U.S.
530 (1940); Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544- (1941); Vernon v. Alabama, 113 U.S. 547
(1941) ; Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941) ; Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942) ;
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944);
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) ; Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949) ; Harris v. South
Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949). See Boskey and Pickering, supra note 1, at 282-295.
31. Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 278-279 (1945); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 45
(1945) ; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 473-474 (1945); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S.
275, 285 (1941).
32. People v. Dale, 406 Ill. 238, 244, 92 N.E.2d 761, 765 (1950): "The remedy provided
for under the Act cannot be employed to obtain another hearing upon claims of denial
1952]
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Both the petitioners and respondent adopted this interpretation. They
disagreed, however, on two principal issues: (1) whether the ruling of the
Illinois Supreme Court, thus interpreted, may be deemed to rest on state
or federal grounds; 33 (2) assuming the decision rests on federal grounds,
whether the Illinois Supreme Court's conception of federal law is correct.
In behalf of the respondent, the Illinois Attorney General argued that
the Illinois court was deciding only on the scope of inquiry authorized under
the Post Conviction Act; that this is exclusively a matter of state procedure,
rather than federal constitutional law; that therefore the writ of certiorari
should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since the decision rests
on an adequate nonfederal ground.34 To this, the petitioners replied in
effect: if that is what the Illinois Supreme Court meant to say, then it chose
an extraordinarily poor way of saying it.3 5 Admittedly the Illinois court
could have held, and might yet eventually hold, that, irrespective of federal
law, the Post Conviction Act does not permit the reconsideration of con-
stitutional issues actually determined at the original trial. But in the cases
at hand, the petitioners contended, the Illinois Supreme Court puqt aside
considerations of state law, and explicitly rested its decision on its own
conception of federal law; therefore it was immaterial that the ruling might
have been rested on state law had the Illinois court chosen such grounds.36
If the Illinois Supreme Court's decision does rest on federal grounds, then
that decision could be supported only if the Illinois court's conception of
federal law was correct-that is, if a federal district court in habeas corpus
proceedings would have been justified in denying the petitioners a hearing
on their confession claims, assuming such a hearing could not be obtained
through Illinois post-trial remedies.
In defense of the decision, the Attorney General contended that'due process
requires only a fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; and
that once the prisoner has obtained such a hearing at his original trial, he
is thereafter precluded from collaterally attacking the court's disposition
of his constitutional claim, whether erroneous or not.
3 7
The petitioners, on the other hand, insisted that the applicable federal law
is otherwise. Their argument ran like this: If there is a federal principle of
res judicata which may be invoked in habeas corpus proceedings to foreclose
a constitutional issue determined at the original trial, the principle is properly
applied only when the prisoner has (or did have) a practical opportunity to
appeal to a higher state tribunal and then ultimately to the United States
Supreme Court. If there exists an effective deterrent to such direct attack
on the trial court's determination, then an equivalent review should be avail-
able via collateral attack. Otherwise the state court's determination of the
federal question would invariably be conclusive. In the instant cases, the
of constitutional rights as to which a full and final hearing on the merits has already
been held".
33. This is invariably a bone of contention where no opinion is written by the state
court. See ROBERTSON AND KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 168-69 (Wolfson and Kurland, 1951). E.g., cases cited in note 35 infra.
34. Brief of Respondent, Jennings v. Illinois, at 5-8. This is the same position success-
fully taken by the Illinois Attorney General in White v. Ragen, Woods v. Nierstheimer,
and Loftus v. Illinois, supra note 9.
35. Brief of Petitioner, Jennings v. Illinois, at 11-12. The language of the state court
judgment in Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (194.5), and Tomkins v. Missouri, 323
U.S. 485 (194-5), was even more ambiguous ("fails to state cause of action"), but in
both instances the Court retained jurisdiction. Cf. Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
36. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 197, n. 1 (1945).
37. Brief of Respondent, Jennings v. Illinois, at 12-13.
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petitioners claimed that their inability to obtain a transcript of the trial
proceedings constituted just such a deterrent, and that therefore a federal
district court would have been unjustified in denying them a hearing on the
confession issue in the absence of an appropriate Illinois remedy.38
Res Judcata in Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings
In determining the applicability of res judicata in federal habeas corpus
proceedings, a distinction must be drawn between issues determined in the
original proceedings and issues determined in prior habeas Corpus proceed-
ings. As to the latter, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that res judicata does not apply.39 But as to issues determined in the original
proceedings, either at the trial or on appeal, the rule is not so clear.
The difficulty lies in the reconciliation of two well established (but not
altogether consistent) principles of federal law: (1) habeas corpus is avail-
able to correct the denial of any constitutional right; (2) habeas corpus cannot
be used as a substitute for an appeal.
(1) The Supreme Court has frequently reaffirmed the principle that
"habeas corpus in the federal courts by one convicted of a criminal offense is
a proper procedure 'to safeguard the liberty of all persons within the juris-
diction of the United States against infringement through any violation of*
the Constitution. . . .' "40 (Italics added.) Thus the Court has sanctioned
collateral attack when the constitutional issue presented was conviction under
an unconstitutional statute,41 lack of indictment for infamous crime,4 2 mob
domination of the trial,4 double jeopardy,4 self-incrimination,4 5 denial of
counsel,4 6 lack of territorial jurisdiction,4 7 prosecutor's knowing use of per-
jured testimony,48 inducing plea of guilty by misrepresentation,4 9 coerced
plea of guilty,50 suppression of testimony favorable to the defendant,51 and
38. Brief of Petitioner, Jennings v. Illinois, at 12-22.
39. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 214 (1950); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101,
105 (1942). But a district court may give "controlling weight" to the denial of a similar
petition on its merits. Salinger v. Loisel, infra note 67, codified in 28 U.S.C. §2244 (Supp.
III 1950).
40. Mr. Justice Reed in Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 274 (1945), quoting Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 331 (1915). See also Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 332 (1941) -
Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 24 (1939). Pertinently the federal habeas corpus statute
applies to prisoners "in custody in violation of the Constitution or of a law or treaty
of the United States.. . ." 28 U.S.C. §2241 (Supp. III 1950). Judge Learned Hand would,
in addition, permit the writ "whenever else resort to it is necessary to prevent a complete
miscarriage of justice." United States ex rel. Kulick v. Kennedy, 157 F.2d 811, 813 (2nd
Cir. 1946). See, in accord, Justices Frankfurter and Rutledge dissenting in Sunal v.
Large, 332 U.S. 174, 187, 188 (1947).
41. Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
42. Ex Parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885). But not the sufficiency of the indictment.
In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1880).
43. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
44. Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 176 (1888), overruling Ex Parte Bigelow, 113 U.S. 328
(1885).
45. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). But cf. Matter of Moran, 203
U.S. 96 (1906).
46. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
47. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939). Contra: Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U.S.
542 (1909).
48. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
49. Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
50. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
51. Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
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deprivation of trial by jury.52 Prior to the Jenings opinion, however, the
Court had never decided whether coerced confession claims were also per-
missible on collateral attack.53
(2) The Court has been likewise insistent in forbidding the use of habeas
corpus as an appeal. 54 Res judicata is of course merely one aspect of this
prohibition, and, for purposes of this discussion, has reference only to those
questions which were actually put in issue and determined. 55
The lower federal courts have not limited their application of this principle
to non-constitutional issues,5 6 but have applied it to constitutional claims as
well. Thus most courts have refused a second hearing when the question raised
on habeas corpus was the admission of a coerced confession 57 or illegally
seized evidence. 58 But Supreme Court decisions indicate that the rule barring
relitigation on habeas corpus is not to be applied as a rule of thumb.59 "The
52. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
53. All of the previous coerced confession cases reaching the United States Supreme
Court (note 30 supra) have been direct review proceedings, except for Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227 (1940). There the confession issue had not been adjudicated at the original
trial. Petitioners alleged that they had been too frightened to complain that the con-
fessions were not voluntary. The Florida Supreme Court accordingly granted leave to
apply to the trial court for a writ of error coram nobis. 113 Fla. 786, 152 So. 437 (1934).
A jury found against the defendants and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. 136 Fla.
568, 187 So. 156 (1939), but the United States Supreme Court reversed, supra.
54. E.g., Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 311 (1946); Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 274 (1943) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
465 (1938). See Note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 657, 667-69 (1948).
55. The Illinois Attorney General would also apply the doctrine to foreclose con-
stitutional issues which could have been raised in the original proceedings. Brief of
Respondent, Jennings v. Illinois, at 5-7. For a similarly strict view, see Sanderlin v.
Smyth, 138 F.2d 729, 731 (4th Cir. 1943); Morton v. Henderson, 123 F.2d 48, 49 (5th
Cir. 1941).
56. E.g., Strewl v. Sanford, 151 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1945) (statute of limitations)
Garrison v. Hunter, 149 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1945) (sufficiency of the evidence) ; Spaulding
v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1944) (sufficiency of the indictment) ; Baker v. Hudspeth,
129 F. 2d 779 (10th Cir. 1942) (competency of the evidence).
57. Cases involving federal prisoners are apparently uniform in holding that the
confession issue may not be relitigated in habeas corpus proceedings. Smith v. United
States, 187 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; Eury v. Huff, 146 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1944) ; Cash v.
Huff, 142 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1944) ; Miller v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 691 (3rd Cir. 1944) ; Burall v.
Johnson, 134 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1942). However, in cases involving state prisoners,
federal courts seem to follow a more flexible approach. In Sharpe v. Kentucky, 135 F.2d
974 (6th Cir. 1942), the confession issue had been submitted to the jury at the original
trial and determined adversely to the prisoner. No appeal was taken. The prisoner then
applied for federal habeas corpus, alleging the use of a coerced confession. The district
court took exhaustive evidence, but made no findings and dismissed the petition on the
ground that the issue could not be properly raised in habeas corpus proceedings. 36 F.
Supp. 386. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, directing the district court to
report its findings. 135 F.2d 974. In response, the district court filed its findings and held
that the petitioner's confession claim was not sustained by the evidence. The Court of
Appeals affirmed. 142 F.2d 213. Compare Schramm v. Brady, 129 F.2d 108 (4th Cir.
1942). In United States ex rel. Mayo v. Burke, 93 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Pa. 1950), the
court granted a hearing on the prisoner's confession claim, but there the issue had not
been adjudicated at the original trial. Id. at 494.
58. Price v. Johnston, 125 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1942); Fowler v. Hunter, 164 F.2d 668
(10th Cir. 1947); Graham v. Squire, 132 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1942); Taylor v. Hudspeth,
113 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1940). But as to state prisoners, the Fourteenth Amendment does
not require exclusion. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
59. See, e.g., Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 334 (1915). Although the ultimate
decision was against the petitioner, the Court rejected the state's argument that considera-
tion of the prisoner's claims was barred by res judicata since each had been previously
adjudicated in the state court. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes was even
more emphatic: "It is significant that the argument for the State does not go so far as
[Vol. 42
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rule is not one defining power but which relates to the appropriate exercise
of power .... (T)he rule is not so inflexible that it may not yield to excep-
tional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of
habeas corpus is apparent."
' 60
'What then are the ,"exceptional circumstances" which render the rule
inapplicable? In Moore v. Dempsey,61 it was mob domination of the trial
that made the whole proceeding a nullity, even though the very grounds
adopted by the Court as the basis for its finding of lack of due process had
been unsuccessfully pressed upon the trial court in a motion for a new trial
and upon the state supreme court as grounds for appeal. In Bowen v. Johns-
ton,62 it was a conflict between state and federal authorities on a question of
territorial jurisdiction, even though the question had been adjudicated at the
original trial and the prisoner had taken no appeal.
In Tinsley v. Treat,6 3 a removal case, it was apparently the practical in-
adequacy of other remedies to correct the trial court's exclusion of -vital
testimony on the sufficiency of the indictment. Conversely, in Sunal v.
Large,6 4 the Court found no such "exceptional circumstances" on the ground
that appeal had been available as a practical matter but the prisoners had
not tried it.
This is much the same position taken by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Smith v. United States.65  In rejecting a federal
prisoner's confession claim, Judge Fahy pointed out the apparent conflict
between "on the one hand Supreme Court opinions stating that habeas corpus
is available to correct the denial of any constitutional right, and on the other
hand, the decisions of the courts of appeals that convictions based on coerced
confessions cannot for that reason alone be set aside on collateral attack by
the habeas corpus procedure. "66 Judge Fahy would reconcile thes two
seemingly opposing views by permitting collateral review of the trial court's
admission of the allegedly coerced confession only when appeal as a practical
matter is unavailable.67 "Such admission alone does not result in the denial
of a constitutional guarantee so long as the error is subject to correction on
to say that in no case would it be permissible on application for habeas corpus to override
the findings of fact by state courts. It would indeed be a most serious thing if this court
were so to hold, for we could not but regard it as a removal of what is perhaps the most
important guaranty of the Federal Constitution." Id. at 348.
60. Chief Justice Hughes in Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1939).
61. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
62. 306 U.S. 19 (1939). Contra, under similar circumstances: Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212
U.S. 542 (1909).
63. 205 U.S. 20 (1907). See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's comment on the case in Sunal v.
Large, 332 U.S. 174, 186 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
64. 332 U.S. 174 (1947). "Appeals could have been taken in these cases, but they
were not. It cannot be said' that absence of counsel made the appeals unavailable as a
practical matter. . . .Defendants had counsel. Nor was there any other barrier to the
perfection of their appeals. .. ." Id. at 177.
65. 187 F.2d 192 (1951).
66. Id. at 197.
67. Cf. Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 231 (1924): "Among the matters which may
be considered and given controlling weight are: (a) the existence of another remedy, such as
a right in ordinary course to an appellate review in the criminal case, and (b) a prior
refusal to discharge on a like application." Judge Fahy's analysis is also consistent with
such cases as Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945), and Eagles v. United States ex rel.
Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946), where questions of the sufficiency of the evidence were
litigated on habeas corpus. In both instances, petitioner was detained under an adminis-
trative order not subject to judicial review.
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an appeal and there is no indication of any deterrent to an appeal such as
lack of counsel. '"68 (Italics added.)
The Transcript Obstacle in Illinois
Although no deterrent to appeal was found in the Smith case, 69 the peti-
tioners adopted its rationale, and insisted that in their cases there existed just
such a deterrent: the failure of Illinois to provide a method by which indigent
prisoners may obtain a transcript of their trial transcript without cost to
themselves (except where the death penalty has been imposed)o70 Certainly
if such "exceptional circumstances" would entitle a federal prisoner to a
relaxation of the res judicata rule, the same principle should apply a fortiori
where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by a state prisoner. The federal
prisoner, after all, has already had his day in a federal court.71
As was made clear at oral argument, the petitioners have never contended
that the state's denial of the transcript to indigent prisoners constitutes in
itself an independent violation of the Constitution, such as a denial of equal
protection of the laws.7 2 The constitutional right for which they seek redress
is instead the right to have coerced confessions excluded from their trials.
The denial of the transcript is therefore pertinent only insofar as it bears
upon the availability of appeal as an adequate remedy to vindicate that right.
At least thirty states,73 as well as the United States government74 and
England, 75 make such a transcript, or an adequate substitute, available with-
out cost to their indigent prisoners for purposes of appeal. The American
Law Institute in 1930 proposed that this practice be uniformly adopted.76
68. 187 F.2d at 197.
69. Ibid.
70. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, §769a (1951).
71. This may explain why federal courts have applied the res judicata rule more
flexibly when dealing with state prisoners. See note 57 supra.
72. See, e.g., Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206, 19 A.L.R. 2d 784 (1951)
(prison officials prevented petitioner from sending out appeal papers; constitutes denial
of equal protection). Accord, Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942).
73. (In each state where the statutory provision is not entirely clear, the practice there-
under has been established by correspondence with the clerk of the state supreme court.)
ARIZ. CODE ANN. §44-2525 (1939); ARK. STAT. ANN. §22-357 (1947); CALIF. CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE §274 (Deering, 1949); CONN. GEN. STAT. §3615, §8796 (1949) (Public
Defender statutes) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. §924.23 (1944); IDAHO CODE §19-2402 (1948) ; IND.
STAT. ANN. §4-3511 (Burns, 1946) ; IOWA CODE ANN. §793.8 (1950) ; Ky. REV. STAT. §28.460
(1948) ; LA. REV. STAT. tit. 15, §555 (1950) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. §27.341 (1938) ; MISS. CODE
§1640 (1944); Mo. REV. STAT. §13354 (1943); MONT. REV. CODES §93-1904 (1949) ; NEB.
REV. STAT. §24-342 (1948); NEV. STAT. XX §11029.03 (Supp. 1950); N.Y. CRIM. CODE
tit. 66, §456 (McKinney, 1945); N.C. GEN. STAT. §7-89 (1944); N.D. REV. CODE §27-0606
(1944); OHIO GEN. CODE §1552 (Page, 1938); OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, §111 (1937) ; ORE.
COMp. L. ANN. §93-276 (1940) ; S.C. CODE §596 (1942) ; TENN. CODE §1108, §8819 (Williams,
1934) (narrative bill of exceptions permitted in lieu of stenographic transcript) ; TExAs
CODE OF CRIM. PROCEDURE Art. 760(6) (Vernon, 1950); UTAH CODE ANN. §21-0-8 (1943);
VA. CODE ANN. §8-330 (1950) (narrative bill of exceptions permitted in lieu of stenographic
transcript); WASH. REV. STAT. §42-5 (Remington, 1932); W. VA. CODE §5251 (Michie,
1949) ; Wis. STAT. §252.20 (1945). Four states permit defendants to obtain the transcript
without cost in special cases. ILL. REV. STAT. C. 38, §769a (1951) (only when death
penalty is imposed) ; N. J. STAT. AN. §2:195-22 (1939) (only when conviction is for first
degree murder and sentence is death) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §1232 (Purdon, 1930)
(only when conviction is for first degree murder; VER. STAT. REV. §1421 (1947) (only when
sentence is death or imprisonment for ten years or more). We are indebted to Don H.
Reuben, Student Editor of the Journal, for research underlying this compilation.
74. 28 U.S.C. §1915 (Supp. III 1950).
75. The Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. VII, c. 23, §16.
76. A. L. I., CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §447 (1931).
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In Illinois, however, the prisoner must pay for his own,7  and, moreover,
must do so within one hundred days after conviction.7 8 If he lacks the neces-
sary funds,79 his theoretical right of appeal may prove illusory, since his
record on writ of error in the Illinois Supreme- Court would then consist
merely of the formal common law record.80 This includes only the indictment,
a stenographic transcript of the arraignment,8 1 and the clerk's perfunctory
entries of the plea, trial, and judgment. The Illinois Supreme Court has
consistently refused to extend its review in such cases to facts and circum-
stances dehors the common law record.82 Furthermore, the common law
record cannot be impeached,except by other matter of record.83 Unless the
record itself substantiates the prisoner's claim, relief is unavailable by writ
of error. Thus the court has summarily, without even a hearing, affirmed
convictions where the constitutional claim was, for example, denial of
counsel,84 incompetent counsel,8 5 state-suborned perjury,86 and coerced plea
of guilty.8 7 The petitioners' coerced confession claims would have received
the same curt treatment.8 8
But the real bite of the denial of the transcript is that it effectively bars
any real opportunity for direct review by the United States Supreme Court.
The Court has reluctantly ruled that its scope of review over judgments of
the Illinois Supreme Court is governed by the Illinois practice; and hence
a judgment must be affirmed if no due process violation is apparent on the
face of the common law record.89
The Jennings Decision
The Court never explicitly resolves the preliminary jurisdictional issue:
whether the Illinois Supreme Court's judgmeht order rests on state or federal
grounds. Indeed, Chief Justice Vinson's language in the majority opinion
77. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 37, §163b (1951).
78. This is the time allowed for the filing of the bill of exceptions and transcript with
the trial judge for his certificate of correctness. ILL. REV. STAT. C. 110, §259.70A (1951).
At the time of Jennings' conviction, only fifty days were allowed. The rule was amended
to its present form in 1950.
79. This appears to be the rule, rather than the exception. See Jenner, supra note 12,
at 350; Comment, 15 U. OF CHL L. REV. 107, 125 (1947).
80. See the Illinois Supreme Court's "announcement" in People v. Loftus, 400 IIl. 432,
433-434, 81 N.E.2d 495, 497 (1950).
81. This is required by Rule 27A of the Illinois Supreme Court, ILL. REV. STAT. C. 110,
§259.27A (1951). The rule was adopted in 1948 to avoid due process claims based on the
absence in the common law record of either a recital of appointment of counsel or a
warning by the court of the consequences of a plea of guilty.
82. See Comment, A Study of the Illinois Supreme Court, 15 U. OF CHL L. REV. 107,
125-126 (1947); and cases cited in notes 83 through 88 infra. Nor may affidavits be
incorporated in the common law record. People v. Twitty, 405 Ill. 60, 89 N.E.2d 827
(1950).
83. People v. Day, 404 Ill. 268, 88 N.E. 727 (1950); People v. Hambleton, 399 Ill. 388,
71 N.E.2d 293 (1948) ; People v. Haupris, 396 Ill. 208, 71 N.E.2d 68 (1947).
84. People v. Creviston, 396 Ill. 78, 71 N.E.2d 25 (1947) ; People v. Loftus, 395 Ill. 479,
70 N.E.2d 573 (1946), 400 Ill. 432, 81 N.E.2d 495 (1948).
85. People v. Kocielko, 404 Ill. 54, 87 N.E.2d 778 (1950); People v. Witt, 394 IL 405,
68 N.E.2d 731 (1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 797 (1946).
86. People v. Davis, 402 Ill. 229, 83 N.E.2d 58 (1949).
87. People v. Van Horn, 396 Ill. 496, 72 N.E.2d 187 (1947) ; People v. Pond, 390 Ill.
237, 61 N.E.2d 37 (1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 749 (1945).
88. People v. Geddes, 396 Ill. 522, 72 N.E.2d 191 (1947); People v. Grant, 385 II.
61, 52 N.E.2d 261 (1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 473 (1944). This was conceded by the
Attorney General at oral argument. See Jennings v. Illinois, 72 S.Ct. 123, 126 (1951).
89. Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947) ; Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
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seems to suggest that one of the reasons for remanding the cases to the Illinois
Supreme Court is to clarify the grounds of decision. 90 But the rest of the
opinion makes it clear that clarification of this issue would serve no real
purpose. Disposition of the three cases is left to the Illinois and lower federal
courts. There is no need for further action by the Court.91 The actual basis
of the Illinois Supreme Court's judgment is therefore of only academic
interest now.
Possible doubt as to its jurisdiction, however, did not prevent the Court
from passing on the substantive issues presented. The Court premises its
reasoning on the proposition that the petitioners are held in custody in viola-
tion of federal constitutional rights (1) if their allegations are true and
(2) if their claims have not been "waived" during or after trial by failure
to seasonably assert them.92 "Petitioners are entitled to their day in court
for resolution of these issues.'' 93 The Court accordingly vacated the judg-
ments below and remanded the cases to the Illinois Supreme Court with
directions to advise the petitioners whether such a determination can be had
under the Post Conviction Act. Most important, if the Illinois Supreme
Court replies in the negative, "petitioners may proceed without more in the
United States District Court."94 (Italics added.) Two Justices dissented, both
on jurisdictional grounds. Mr. Justice Minton was of the opinion that the
Illinois Supreme Court's judgment rested on an adequate state ground, while
Mr. Justice Frankfurter would have dismissed the, writs for want of a
properly presented federal question.
The majority opinion is also significant for what it does not say. The
Court completely ignores two early holdings which indicated that a state
prisoner's inability to appeal is immaterial in determining his eligibility for
federal habeas corpus.9 5 Even more conspicuous by its absence in the opinion
is any mention of the effect of the pre-conviction adjudication of the peti-
90. 72 S.Ct. at 127. This was the Court's disposition of Loftus v. Illinois, 334 U.S.
804 (1948).
91. Unlike Loftus v. Illinois, supra note 90, the instant cases were not continued on
the Court's calendar pending further consideration by the Illinois Supreme Court.
92. 72 S.Ct. at 127. On "waiver," see Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), and
cases cited therein. Conceivably Jennings and Sherman might have waived their perjury
claims (supra note 21) by failing to assert them at the trial or on motion for new trial,
but it is difficult to see how any of the three petitioners could have waived their con-
fession claims. Each vigorously fought the admission of the allegedly coerced confessions.
93. 72 S.Ct. at 127. As discussed infra, the opinion ignores the fact that the petitioners
have already had a "day in court" on their confession claims!
94. Ibid.
95. Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U.S. 184 (1899); United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler,
269 U.S. 13 (1925). In both cases, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of habeas
corpus, holding that all available appellate remedies had not been exhausted, since neither
petitioner had sued out a writ of error from the state court of last resort to the United
States Supreme Court. Petitioner Markuson attempted to explain his failure to do so on
the ground that he lacked funds to employ counsel. Petitioner Kennedy had pleaded
inability to furnish bonds required on appeal. The Court did not feel that either circum-
stance justified a departure from the exhaustion rule. 175 U.S. at 186, 269 U.S. at 19.
Although in both cases the unexhausted remedy was writ of error in the United States
Supreme Court, they have been understood by some lower federal courts as holding that
poverty is no excuse for failing to exhaust state remedies as well. See United States ex rel.
Rheim v. Foster, 175 F.2d 772, 773 (3rd Cir. 1949); Ex Parte Stonefield, 36 F. Supp.
453, 456 (W.D. Ky. 1941) ; Ex Parte Sharpe, 36 F. Supp. 386, 388 (W.D. Ky. 1941), reqd
on other grounds sub nom. Sharpe v. Kentucky, supra note 57. Potter v. Dowd, 146 F.2d
244, 247 (7th Cir. 1944) represents a more liberal view. The court held that the facts
that petitioner was "without means of hiring counsel and of paying for a record for use
in perfecting an appeal from the judgment dismissing his petition for writ of error coram
nobis" were sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.
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tioners' confession claims. The opinion expressly recognizes that a prisoner
may forfeit constitutional claims by "waiver," ' 96 but is silent as to the
ostensibly basic controversy: whether such claims may be similarly foreclosed
by the doctrine of res judicata. This omission, coupled with a literal reading
of the Chief Justice's remarks, would suggest a tacit rejection of res judicata
as a defense to constitutional claims in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
Yet it hardly seems likely that such a far-reaching step would be announced
by mere implication. At best, the decision must be limited to the particular
facts of the cases before the Court.
As applied to those facts, the decision seems ,an eminently desirable one.
True, a state prisoner has no federal constitutional right to an appeal,97 and
much less any right to an appeal in forma pauperis. He is, however, entitled
to the protection of the federal courts from errors of the trial court amounting
to state denial of due process, if redress cannot be had in the state courts.
Otherwise enforcement of the guarantees of Fourteenth Amendment would
be left exclusively to the states. This would be contrary to the principal
reason for existence of our federal system of courts.
9 8
Once this right to protection by the federal courts be admitted, it is difficult
to avoid the Court's conclusion. The form of this protection, after all, should
hardly be the controlling consideration. If direct review by the United States
Supreme Court is cut off by the failure of the state to provide its indigent
prisoners a transcript without cost, then it would seem that collateral review
should be available via federal habeas corpus, notwithstanding any rule of
res judicata ordinarily applicable to the claims of federal prisoners.
Alternatives Open to the Illinois Supreme Court
On remand, assuming that the petitioners are able to sustain their claims
of poverty, the Illinois Supreme Court could dispose of the cases by any one
of at least four methods.
(1) The court could hold that one's inability to, appeal is irrelevant to
the permissible scope of inquiry under the Post Conviction Act, which, as
a matter of state law, does not permit the reconsideration of issues adjudicated
at the trial. The petitioners would then of course have immediate access to
the federal, courts.
(2) The court might conceivably find that some method of obtaining direct
review of the trial proceedings by writ of error is still available to the
petitioners. This seems doubtful in the apparent absence of any Illinois
authority, statutory or judicial, for review by a narrative bill of exceptions,
a "bystander's bill," or the "judge's notes." 99
(3) The court could hold, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter contended in his
dissenting opinion, that the federal claims had not been properly presented
in the petitioners' applications to the trial court for a Post Conviction hearing
96. See note 92 supra.
97. The right of appeal "is not essential to due process provided that due process has
already been accorded in the tribunal of first instance." State of Ohio ex rel. Bryant v.
Akron Park District, 281 U.S. 74-, 80 (1930). See Cobbledich v. United States, 309 U.S.
323, 325 (1939) ; Luckenback v. United Statis, 272 U.S. 533, 536 (1926). But if the state
extends the right of appeal to some members of a class of defendants, it must consti-
tutionally extend the same right to all members of that class. See Dowd v. United States
ex rel. Cook, note 72 supra.
98. Cf. DOME, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE'3 (1928): "One almost instinctively
shudders at what might have been had the Constitution been turned over to the tender
interpretative mercies of the courts of the states. . ....
99. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting, 72 S. Ct. at 128-29, n. 2.
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